




ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 






In August 2009, Westchester County, New York 
entered into a consent decree to settle a lawsuit brought 
against it pursuant to the federal False Claims Act.  Serving 
as a qui tam relator on behalf of the United States 
government, a non-profit alleged that Westchester had falsely 
certified that it had complied with its obligations to 
affirmatively further fair housing in order to receive over $50 
million in federal housing funds.  According to the relators, 
Westchester had failed to undertake basic fair housing 
requirements such as considering race-based impediments to 
housing choice.  The litigation was the first to employ the 
FCA as a method to enforce a locality‟s obligation to 
affirmatively further fair housing and thus represents an 
innovative model for litigation aimed at reforming major social 
institutions.  This Article situates the Westchester case in 
ongoing debates about the legitimacy and efficacy of 
institutional reform litigation and concludes that the public-
private partnership model offered by the FCA addresses some 
common criticisms of litigation as a method of institutional 
change. 
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 Litigation aimed at reforming social institutions has changed 
substantially since the Supreme Court first ordered district courts to 
oversee school desegregation.1  Scholars have questioned the 
efficacy and legitimacy of litigation as a method of social change, 
and courts have fashioned doctrines limiting the availability of the 
sorts of injunctive relief ordered in Brown v. Board of Education and its 
progeny.  As a result, modern courts are less likely to design and 
enforce sweeping equitable relief compelling action from institutions 
like housing authorities, school boards, or prisons.  These changes 
do not mean, however, that plaintiffs no longer seek structural 
reform through litigation.  Rather, advocates have responded by 
adjusting the forms of these suits, including pursuing innovative 
causes of action and seeking narrowly-tailored remedies.2 
 This Article discusses a recent lawsuit against Westchester 
County, New York as an example of an inventive method of 
initiating institutional reform.  A private party, on behalf of the 
government, brought suit under the qui tam provision of the False 
                                                                                                       
1  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
2  For more detailed discussions of how advocates have tailored these 
lawsuits, see, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural 
Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1411 (2007) (discussing recent 
qualitative changes in the nature of institutional reform lawsuits); Susan P. 
Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 
721 (1993) (noting procedural innovations in corrections reform litigation). 
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Claims Act (FCA),3 challenging Westchester‘s failure to honor its 
agreement that it would further civil rights conditions in exchange 
for federal housing funds.  Situating this case study within debates 
about expansive judicial relief, this Article argues that the public-
private partnership model of qui tam provisions is responsive to 
critiques of institutional reform litigation.  This discussion is 
especially relevant in light of the fact that Congress recently targeted 
the FCA as a method of monitoring federal spending—the federal 
―bailout‖ and the healthcare reform act both amended the FCA to 
facilitate qui tam lawsuits.4 
 Part Two discusses both the qui tam provision of the FCA 
and the civil rights requirement to further fair housing, with which 
Westchester agreed to comply as a condition of receiving federal 
housing grants.5  This Part also identifies the lack of enforcement of 
housing laws as a contributing factor to continuing racial 
segregation.  Part Three discusses how the private litigant in the 
Westchester case utilized the qui tam provision of the FCA to 
remedy the County‘s civil rights violations.  Part Four outlines the 
principal arguments that have been advanced for and against 
institutional reform litigation.  Finally, Part Five situates the 
Westchester case study in these debates and argues that the qui tam 
model is responsive to some of the more prominent critiques. 
 
II. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND FEDERAL HOUSING 
GRANTS 
 
A. The Qui Tam Provision of the False Claims Act  
 
1. A Brief History and Renewed Interest 
 
Qui tam provisions allow a private party to bring a civil 
action in the name of the government.  The person who pursues the 
action—the relator—receives a portion of any amount recovered on 
the government‘s behalf.  Although variants of these provisions date 
back to thirteenth century England,6 and early American Congresses 
                                                                                                       
3  31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3733 (West 2010).  
4  Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 
123 Stat. 1617 (amending False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733); Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119, at § 10104(j)(2) (2010). 
5  42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2) (2006). 
6  See Kary Klismet, Quo Vadis, “Qui Tam?” The Future of Private False 
Claims Act Suits Against States After Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. 
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enacted several qui tam statutes,7 the qui tam provision of the FCA 
has generated the most contemporary litigation.8   
Congress enacted the FCA during the Civil War to curb 
frauds perpetrated by war profiteers against the Union Army.9  The 
FCA was designed as a whistleblower statute to encourage private 
parties to alert the government when a federal contractor was 
providing shoddy arms, such as artillery shells filled with sawdust.10  
As enacted, the FCA broadly applied to any person or entity that 
submitted a false claim for payment involving the use of federal 
revenue.11  Over the next several decades, abuses by relators led to 
judicial limitations, ultimately resulting in restrictive amendments in 
1946 that effectively precluded any viable use of the Act for the next 
forty years.12   
Following public exposure of excessive prices paid by the 
Department of Defense to contractors, Congress amended the FCA 
in 1986 to make it significantly easier and financially more attractive 
for private relators to bring claims under the qui tam provision.13  
Unsurprisingly, qui tam actions increased dramatically:  Only thirty-
two qui tam suits were filed in 1987, and they resulted in no 
recoveries.  Since 1986, however, the federal government has 
recovered more than $22 billion from qui tam actions, including a 
                                                                                                       
United States ex rel. Stevens, 87 IOWA L. REV. 283, 287-88 (2001) 
(describing history of qui tam actions). 
7  See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of 
Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 553 (2000) (listing early qui tam 
provisions). 
8  Id. at 555 (noting substantial amount of litigation in the past twenty 
years driven by the False Claims Act).   
9  Id. (describing history of enactment). 
10  Id. 
11  See Sean Hamer, Lincoln‟s Law:  Constitutional and Policy Issues Posed by 
the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 89, 90 
(1997).  
12  See Beck, supra note 7, at 561. This Article provides only a brief 
sketch of the FCA here because other authors have detailed the fascinating 
history of the Act in other pieces. For more thorough discussions of the 
FCA, see id. at 555-61 (providing a detailed discussion of the history of the 
FCA); CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE 
GOVERNMENT § 2:3 (2010) (providing overview of history of the qui tam 
provision of the FCA and collecting sources); see also Vt. Agency Natural 
Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774-77 (2000) (discussing 
the history of qui tam actions in England and the American Colonies).   
13  See Beck, supra note 7, at 561-62. 
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total of at least $1 billion per year recovered in eight of the last ten 
years.14 
More recently, two major pieces of legislation have amended 
the FCA to facilitate enforcement of fraud associated with federal 
expenditures.  First, Congress enacted the Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) as companion legislation to facilitate 
enforcement of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008—the federal ―bailout.‖15  In addition to streamlining several 
procedural mechanisms to incentivize FCA claims, FERA abrogated 
a Supreme Court decision and a D.C. Circuit decision that each read 
the qui tam provisions narrowly.16  Second, as discussed below, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)—the recent 
health care overhaul—amended the FCA in several ways to 
encourage relator claims.17  In addition to these amendments, 
several bills that would expand the FCA remain in various stages of 
the legislative process.18  In short, Congress has revitalized the FCA 
as a robust tool to combat fraud against the government. 
 
2. Elements of a Qui Tam Case 
 
To establish liability under the FCA, a relator must establish 
that (1) a false claim or false statement (2) was submitted to the 
United States for payment (3) with the knowledge that the claim or 
                                                                                                       
14  See Christopher C. Burris et al., Converging Events Signal a Changing 
Landscape in False Claims Act and Whistle-Blower Litigation and Investigations, 56 
FED. LAW. 59, 59-60 (2009). 
15  Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
21, 123 Stat. 1617 (amending False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 
(2006)). 
16  See id.; see also Burris, supra note 14, at 59-62 (describing 
amendments).  The legislation was responsive to Allison Engine Co. Inc. v. 
United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008) (holding FCA did not 
establish liability for false claims made to government contractors and 
grantees, as opposed to claims made directly to the government), as well as 
United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(requiring that false claim be presented directly to federal government as 
opposed to a government grantee).  According to the Senate Report, these 
amendments were aimed at uncovering ―corporate and mortgage frauds that 
have contributed to the recent economic collapse‖ and protecting the 
massive outflow of federal funds expended in response to the economic 
crises.  S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 1 (2009). 
17  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119, at § 10104(j)(2) (2010). See infra notes 30-33 
(discussing amendments). 
18  See Burris, supra note 14, at 62 (discussing pending legislation). 
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statement in support of the claim was false or fraudulent.19  The 
―knowledge‖ prong does not require specific intent to defraud; a 
showing that a defendant ―reckless[ly] disregard[ed] the truth or 
falsity of the information‖ can be sufficient.20  Likewise, the term 
―claim‖ means simply ―any request or demand, whether under a 
contract or otherwise, for money or property.‖21  
In addition to establishing these underlying elements, a 
relator must follow several procedural steps to accommodate 
government involvement in an FCA suit.  She must serve a copy of 
the complaint and disclose all material evidence to the government.  
The complaint is not immediately served on the defendant and 
remains sealed for at least sixty days.22  The government can elect to 
either take over the action entirely or decline to participate, in which 
case the relator can continue with the case.23  If the government 
pursues the action, the private relator can continue as a party.24  The 
government has the power to dismiss the suit, but not until the 
relator has an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.25  Regardless 
of objections from the relator, the government can settle the action 
as long as the court determines that the settlement is fair.26  Finally, 
upon a showing by the government, the court can limit participation 
by the private party in various other ways.27 
The FCA also contains numerous pitfalls for an unwary 
relator which are designed to limit frivolous suits based on widely-
known information.  Notably, a relator cannot bring suit based on a 
―publicly disclosed‖ fraud.28  Specifically, any transaction disclosed 
in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, or from the news 
media is not actionable.29  Until recently, this ―public disclosure bar‖ 
had been one of the most difficult barriers for relators to overcome.  
The PPACA, however, lowered this bar considerably:  Whereas the 
                                                                                                       
19  31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 2010) (reaching, inter alia, any 
person who ―knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval‖ or ―knowingly makes, uses, or 
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or 
fraudulent claim‖). 
20  Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A) & (B). 
21  Id. § 3729(b)(2). 
22  Id. § 3730(b)(2). 
23  Id. § 3730(b)(4). 
24  Id. § 3730(c)(1). 
25  Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A). 
26  Id. § 3730(c)(2)(B). 
27  Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C). 
28  Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
29  Id. 
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provision was previously labeled ―jurisdictional,‖ thereby requiring a 
court to dismiss claims based on publicly disclosed information, the 
government now has the power to oppose dismissal.30  Likewise, the 
PPACA reversed a recent Supreme Court decision holding that 
disclosures in state or local government reports or proceedings 
barred actions; now only disclosures in federal proceedings qualify 
as ―publicly disclosed.‖31  Finally, even if material has been disclosed 
publicly, there is an exception for parties that are ―original source[s]‖ 
of information.32  The PPACA broadened this exception by 
substituting a requirement that relators have ―direct‖ knowledge of 
the facts underlying the allegations with language allowing for suits 
based on ―knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to 
the publicly disclosed allegations.‖33  Presumably, the FCA no 
longer requires that relators have first-hand knowledge of 
information as long as they acquired information independently of 
public disclosures.   
If a relator is successful, damages can be substantial.  A 
person who presents a fraudulent claim to the United States is liable 
for civil penalties of between $5,500 and $11,000 for each claim, as 
well as treble the damages sustained by the government.34  The 
relator can receive anywhere from fifteen to thirty percent of the 
proceeds of the action or settlement, as well as attorneys‘ fees and 
costs.35 
The client agencies in the vast majority of FCA actions have 
been the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the 
Department of Defense (DOD).36  Common actions charge a health 
                                                                                                       
30  Robert T. Rhoad & Matthew T. Fornataro, Whistling While They 
Work: Limiting Exposure in the Face of the PPACA‟s Invitation to Employee 
Whistleblower Lawsuits, 22 HEALTH LAW. 19 (2010) (describing amendment to 
FCA). 
31  See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States ex rel. Wilson, 130 S. Ct. 1396 (2010) (interpreting the FCA as the text 
stood before PPACA amendments). 
32  31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) & (B). 
33  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119, at § 10104(j)(2) (2010) (amending the False Claims 
Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730). 
34  31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1). The statutory penalties may be adjusted 
for inflation. See 28 C.F.R. § 85.3 (2010) (raising penalties from range of 
$5,000 to $10,000 to range of $5,500 to $11,000). 
35  31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d). 
36  See CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS—
OVERVIEW (Oct. 1, 1986 – Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.justice.  
gov/opa/pr/2008/November/fraud-statistics1986-2008.htm (During the 
period of 1986 to 2008, 3,306 new qui tam actions were filed with HHS as 
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care provider with presenting a claim to Medicare for 
reimbursement of services that were never performed, were not 
performed adequately, or were performed in violation of an 
applicable regulatory or statutory provision.37  Likewise, FCA cases 
still target military contractors who provide inadequate goods or fail 
to test properly products sold to the DOD.38  These sorts of cases 
are intuitively fraudulent because a party seeks reimbursement for a 
service never performed or for faulty goods. 
The Westchester lawsuit addressed a different kind of case:  
As a condition attached to receiving federal funds, Westchester 
agreed to comply with federal civil rights provisions.  The next 
section discusses the underlying civil rights requirement attached to 
the housing grants provided to Westchester. 
 
B. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing 
 
1. Statutory and Regulatory Background 
 
In 1968, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act.39  This Act 
contained two provisions directing the federal government 
―affirmatively to further fair housing‖ (AFFH).  Section 3608(e)(5) 
requires the Secretary of the United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) to ―administer the programs and 
activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner 
affirmatively to further the purposes of [the Fair Housing Act].‖40  
Section 3608(d) imposes the obligation to affirmatively further fair 
housing on other federal departments and agencies.41   
 Likewise, and importantly for the purposes of this Article, 
compliance with AFFH obligations is a condition for grantees to 
                                                                                                       
the client agency, and 1,202 new qui tam actions were filed with the DOD as 
the client agency.  All other new qui tam matters combined totaled only 
1,691.). 
37  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386 F.3d 235 
(3d Cir. 2004) (finding kick-back scheme perpetrated by Medicare 
participants actionable under FCA); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 
2001) (alleging false reimbursement requests to government for services 
performed on inaccurately calibrated equipment); United States ex rel. Roy v. 
Anthony, 914 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (alleging services never 
performed); see also ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM 
WHISTLEBLOWER 4 (2001) (listing common types of qui tam actions). 
38  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 97 F.3d 937 
(7th Cir. 1996) (contractor allegedly failed to test equipment properly). 
39  42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (2006). 
40  Id. § 3608(e)(5). 
41  Id. § 3608(d). 
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receive Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs), which 
help states and local governments fund housing and community 
development projects in low-income neighborhoods.42  Specifically, 
a grantee must certify that ―the grant will be conducted and 
administered in conformity with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq.] and the Fair Housing Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 
3601 et seq.], and the grantee will affirmatively further fair 
housing.‖43 
The meaning of the phrase ―affirmatively to further fair 
housing‖ is famously ambiguous,44 and for such a seemingly broad 
mandate, the legislative history accompanying the relevant statutes is 
surprisingly sparse and uninformative.45  A series of cases in the 
1970s read the AFFH provision as requiring, at a minimum, that 
HUD and grant recipients do more than simply refrain from 
discriminating, or purposely aiding discrimination by others.46  HUD 
and localities also must create housing opportunities in low-poverty, 
majority-white neighborhoods in order to promote racial 
integration.47  The regulations implementing the AFFH provision in 
the CDBG program now require grantees to:  (1) conduct an 
analysis to identify impediments to fair housing choice, typically 
referred to as an ―AI‖; (2) take appropriate actions to overcome any 
impediments identified; and (3) maintain records reflecting the 
analysis and actions taken.48  Beyond these requirements, HUD has 
created a Fair Housing Planning Guide to assist grantees to fulfill 
the CDBG fair housing requirements.49  Finally, representatives 
from HUD have indicated that the agency is revising its federal 
grant regulations to provide ―more concrete, specific information 
                                                                                                       
42  Id. § 5304(b)(2). 
43  Id. 
44  See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 154, 194-95 (2011). 
45  See Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing 
in Regional Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 
42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 371-72 (2007) (discussing meaning of, and 
legislative history accompanying, AFFH provision).   
46  For an overview of the most relevant cases, see Roisman, supra 
note 45, at 363-68. 
47  See Johnson, supra note 44, at 194-95. 
48  24 C.F.R. §§ 91.225 & 570.601 (2010). 
49  U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FAIR HOUSING PLANNING 
GUIDE (1996), available at http://www.disasterhousing.gov/offices/fheo/ 
images/fhpg.pdf.  
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about how to develop a meaningful plan for affirmatively furthering 
fair housing.‖50 
2. The Problem of Weak Enforcement 
 
Despite these fair housing laws, communities throughout 
the United States are still highly segregated by race.51  The causes of 
community segregation are myriad, but at a minimum exclusionary 
zoning and other local land use decisions have contributed to 
segregated neighborhoods.52  Policymakers and scholars tend to 
agree that, although enforcement of housing laws should be a 
primary tool to combat these problems, enforcement has been weak 
and inconsistent.53  HUD‘s enforcement departments are 
―chronically understaffed, under-funded, and marginalized within 
the HUD structure‖ and because the DOJ has not played a major 
part in enforcing housing violations, ―federal enforcement has been 
inconsistent and soft.‖54   
Specifically with respect to the AFFH provisions, HUD 
―has not been successful in bringing the affirmatively furthering 
                                                                                                       
50  Written Statement of John D. Trasviña, HUD Assistant Sec‘y for 
Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, Before the House Subcommittee on 
Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity (Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://www.house.  
gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/trasvina_-_hud.pdf. 
51  See, e.g., James Robert Breymaier, The Need to Prioritize the Affirmative 
Furthering of Fair Housing: A Case Statement, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 245, 246 
(2009). The American Communities Project offers an impressive collection 
of statistics on segregation.  See AMERICAN COMMUNITIES PROJECT, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, METROPOLITAN RACIAL AND ETHNIC CHANGE—
CENSUS 2000, available at http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/data.html. 
52  NAT‘L COMM‘N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE 
FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING 10 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.  
civilrights.org/publications/reports/fairhousing/future_of_fair_housing_re
port.pdf. Likewise, private actions such as real estate broker ―steering,‖ and 
discrimination in loan products continue to exist.  Id. 
53  See id. at 13-18 (noting weak enforcement by HUD, and discussing 
delayed investigations, missed opportunities for systemic investigations, and 
inconsistencies between HUD and regional offices); Steven Plitt & Daniel 
Maldonado, Prohibiting De Facto Insurance Redlining: Will Hurricane Katrina Draw 
a Discriminatory Redline in the Gulf Coast Sands Prohibiting Access to Home 
Ownership?, 14 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 199, 211-13 (2008) 
(discussing weak enforcement mechanisms provided to HUD); Florence 
Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
Program and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1037-38 (1998) 
(noting that HUD enforcement has been weak).  
54  Breymaier, supra note 51, at 247. 
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obligation to life.‖55  According to a recent commission co-chaired 
by two former HUD Secretaries, HUD has ―failed to adequately 
monitor or enforce [AFFH rules] among federal grantees.‖56  
Specifically, even though grantees must certify that they are 
affirmatively furthering fair housing, ―HUD requires no evidence 
that anything is actually being done as a condition of funding and it 
does not take adverse action if jurisdictions are directly involved in 
discriminatory action or fail to affirmatively further fair housing.‖57  
As a result, ―less than 10 percent of the approximately 1,100 CDBG 
entitlement jurisdictions in the country actually have programs that 
really address fair housing concerns in their communities.‖58 
Accordingly, despite the success of some celebrated cases,59 HUD 
and CDBG grantees consistently fail to satisfy their statutory 
mandates to affirmatively further fair housing.60  The next Part 
discusses an innovative approach taken by a private advocacy group 
to fill this enforcement gap using the FCA.61 
                                                                                                       
55  NAT‘L COMM‘N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra 
note 52, at 37. 
56  Id. at 38. 
57  Id. at 44. 
58  Id. at 45. 
59  See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); NAACP, Boston 
Chapter v. Sec‘y of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 154 (1st Cir. 1987); Otero v. N.Y. 
City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 
809 (3d Cir. 1970); Thompson v. HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. 2005).  
60  In September 2010, the Government Accountability Office issued 
a report detailing an investigation of compliance by state and local 
governments with their obligations to AFFH. The report estimated that 
twenty-nine percent of all AIs are outdated, and that ―the vast majority also 
lack time frames for implementing identified recommendations or the 
signatures of top elected officials, both of which are necessary to establish 
clear accountability to carrying out the AFFH intent.‖ U.S. GOV‘T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY GRANTS: HUD 
NEEDS TO ENHANCE ITS REQUIREMENTS AND OVERSIGHT OF 
JURISDICTIONS‘ FAIR HOUSING PLANS 31 (Sept. 2010), available at http://  
www.gao.gov/new.items/d10905.pdf. 
61  For a discussion of the possibility of enforcing AFFH provisions 
through private rights of action, see Michelle Ghaznavi Collins, Note, 
Opening Doors to Fair Housing:  Enforcing the Affirmatively Further Provision of the 
Fair Housing Act Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2135 (2010). 
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III. A CASE STUDY:  UNITED STATES EX REL. ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION CENTER V. WESTCHESTER 
A. The Litigation  
 
In 2006, a nonprofit called the Anti-Discrimination Center 
of Metro New York, Inc. (ADC) brought suit as an FCA qui tam 
relator for the United States of America against Westchester County, 
New York (―Westchester‖ or ―the County‖).62  Westchester is 
comprised of forty-five municipal entities outside of New York 
City.63  Over the course of six years, the County applied to HUD for 
federal funding, including CDBGs.64  In order to receive these 
funds, Westchester certified to HUD that the County, and the 
associated municipal entities, would ―affirmatively further fair 
housing.‖65 
Westchester is racially segregated, and during the litigation, 
an expert for Westchester ―acknowledge[d] the existence of racial 
‗concentration‘ in parts of the County.‖66  As noted above, the 
statutory and regulatory framework detailing the certification 
process required Westchester to ―analyze the impact of race on 
housing opportunities and choice in its jurisdiction.‖67  Despite these 
requirements, the County did not deem itself or any of its 
municipalities to be failing to AFFH, and it did not withhold any 
funds from participating municipalities for failing to AFFH.68  
With this background in mind, ADC‘s claims as a relator 
under the FCA were fairly obvious:  Westchester knowingly made 
false certifications that it would AFFH.69  ADC supported these 
claims by pointing to documents responsive to New York‘s 
Freedom of Information Law, as well as to acknowledgments that 
                                                                                                       
62  United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. 
v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
63  Land Use and Development, WESTCHESTER CNTY., N.Y., http://  
planning.westchestergov.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=834&Itemid=1461 (last visited September 25, 2010).   
64  United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc., 668 F. 
Supp. 2d at 551.   
65  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2) (2006)). 
66  Id. at 559 (―According to the 2000 census, over half of the 
municipalities in the Consortium had African-American populations of 3% 
or less.‖). 
67  Id. at 552. 
68  Id. at 559. 
69  United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. 
v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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County employees made to ADC that their ―demographic analysis 
for the purpose of identifying impediments to fair housing did not 
encompass race, but only examined housing needs based on 
income.‖70  Therefore, the County refused to identify or analyze 
community resistance to integration based on race as was required 
by a proper report under the CDBG statutory and regulatory 
framework.71  The Government initially declined to take over the 
action, and ADC served its complaint on Westchester.72   
In 2007, the district court made its first major decision in 
the case.73  After consideration of the statutory and regulatory 
framework, in combination with HUD‘s Fair Housing Planning 
Guide, the court rejected Westchester‘s argument that it had no duty 
to consider race or racial discrimination when identifying 
impediments to fair housing choice.74  Two years later, after the 
parties completed discovery, the court turned to the remaining 
issues on cross-motions for summary judgment.75  As noted above, 
liability requires a plaintiff to show (1) a false claim or false 
statement (2) was submitted to the United States for payment (3) 
with the knowledge that the claim or statement in support of the 
claim was false or fraudulent.  As to the falsity prong, the court 
recognized that federal law required Westchester to analyze whether 
race impeded fair housing and to make a record of that analysis.76  
The certifications were false because the County did neither.77  The 
knowledge element was a closer case.  On the one hand, the County 
was aware of the HUD Planning Guide and other training materials, 
and internal County memoranda indicated that Westchester 
employees were informed that the AFFH obligations required them 
to analyze race.78  However, the court declined to grant summary 
judgment in favor of ADC because the County voluntarily 
submitted to HUD more information about its housing analysis 
than required by HUD regulations—an odd act if the County knew 
them to be false—permitting the inference that it did not act with 
                                                                                                       
70  Id.   
71  Id. at 378. That framework is discussed supra notes 39-43 and 
accompanying text. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. at 375. 
74  Id. at 387. 
75  United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. 
v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
76  Id. at 560-65. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. at 567-68. 
 
2011  COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW 42 
  
 
the knowledge that the claim or statement in support of the claim 
was false or fraudulent.79 
Despite this final point, the court‘s order was a major win 
for ADC:  The court granted summary judgment in favor of ADC 
on almost every major issue, and ADC could proceed to trial on the 
remaining knowledge element.  This victory caught the attention of 
the federal government.  On August 10, 2009, the United States 
simultaneously intervened in the FCA action80 and filed a settlement 
with Westchester.81  The County agreed to spend $51.6 million to 
develop affordable housing, with at least eighty-four percent of total 
units built in municipalities where African American residents 
constituted three percent or less of the population and Hispanic 
residents made up less than seven percent.82  Moreover, the County 
agreed to take action against resistant municipalities where needed in 
order to fulfill AFFH obligations.83  The government selected a 
court appointed monitor to observe and analyze the County‘s 
progress.84  Finally, ADC received $2.5 million as expenses, 
attorneys‘ fees, and costs.85 
 
B. Subsequent Events  
 
The settlement immediately sparked controversy.  The New 
York Times covered the resolution favorably, labeling it a ―landmark 
desegregation agreement.‖86  The Deputy Secretary of HUD, Ron 
Sims, identified the settlement as ―consistent with the President‘s 
desire to see a fully integrated society . . . . Until now, we tended to 
lay dormant.  This is historic, because we are going to hold people‘s 
feet to the fire.‖87  In contrast, an editorial in The Wall Street Journal 
lamented that ―social engineers [who] want to force the issue [of 
                                                                                                       
79  Id.   
80  Complaint-in-Intervention of the United States of America, United 
States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester 
Cnty., N.Y., No. 06 Civ. 2860 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009).  
81 Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal, United States 
ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y. Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., No. 
06 Civ. 2860 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009). 
82  Id. at 6-11. 
83  Id. at 19-27. 
84  Id. at 11-19. 
85  Id. at 5. 
86  Sam Roberts, Westchester Adds Housing to Desegregation Pact, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at N.Y./Region. 
87  Peter Applebome, Integration Faces a New Test in the Suburbs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, at Week in Review. 
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housing integration] risk creating more problems than they solve.‖88  
In a separate piece, The Wall Street Journal speculated that the 
settlement ―could have ramifications far beyond‖ Westchester 
because ―some 1,225 cities, counties, and state governments have 
accepted [CDBGs] since the program began 35 years ago.‖89 
The Westchester County Board of Legislators approved the 
settlement in late September.90  Whether the County will adequately 
implement the settlement remains to be seen.  In a letter to the 
editor of The Yonkers Tribune a few days after the settlement 
announcement, a candidate for Westchester County Executive 
named Rob Astorino argued that the real issue in the settlement was 
―home rule, the right of Westchester towns and villages to 
determine local policy.‖91  Rob Astorino was elected Westchester 
County Executive three months later,92 suggesting public support 
for political resistance to implementation efforts. 
Since the agreement, however, the appointed Monitor has 
played a major role in facilitating creation of an Implementation 
Plan (IP) and mediating between the County, HUD, and ADC.  The 
Monitor met with the County Executive and other County officials, 
as well as with the General Counsel and assistant secretaries of 
HUD.93  The Monitor also selected a Housing Advisor approved by 
HUD and the County to work as an expert in the implementation 
                                                                                                       
88  Review & Outlook, Color-Coding the Suburbs:  The Social Engineers 
Come to Scarsdale, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2009, at Review & Outlook. 
89  Nick Timiraos, Westchester Settlement: „Removing ZIP Code as Quality of 
Life Factor,‟ WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Aug. 11, 2009 12:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.  
com/developments/2009/08/11/westchester-settlement-removing-zip-
code-as-quality-of-life-factor/?keywords=westchester+county+settlement. 
90  Joshua Brustein, Westchester Board Approves a Housing-Integration Pact, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, at N.Y./Region. 
91  Rob Astorino, Letter to the Editor, Big Brother About to Descend on 
Westchester, YONKERS TRIBUNE, Aug. 12, 2009. 
92  Meet the County Executive, WESTCHESTER CNTY., N.Y., http://  
www3.westchestergov.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=2561&Itemid=300260 (last visited Dec. 1, 2010) (―Westchester County 
Executive Rob Astorino was elected in November 2009 after running a 
successful campaign to streamline county government and bring tax relief to 
homeowners and businesses. His message resonated with voters across 
Westchester as he was elected with 58 percent of the vote.‖). 
93  Amended Monitor‘s Report Regarding Implementation of the 
Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal for the Period of August 
10, 2009 Through February 10, 2010, at 3, United States ex rel. Anti-
Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., No. 06 
Civ. 2860 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Amended Monitor‘s 
Report], available at http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/files/ 
0328-1.pdf. 
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and sought funding to work with environmental and local land use 
experts from the Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy at 
New York University.94 
The County submitted its first IP in January of 2010.  After 
receiving comments from the ADC and HUD, however, the 
Monitor rejected the plan because it lacked ―any concrete short-, 
medium- or long-term strategies‖ for implementation, and it was 
―not transparent as to who within County government [would] be 
responsible for the various tasks‖ necessary to implement the plan.95  
On March 16, 2010, HUD issued a press release stating a newer 
revised IP was still deficient:  ―We have seen two versions of the 
implementation plan and, while the County has worked to improve 
it, there is still work to be done to set a clear strategy for promoting 
diverse, inclusive communities.‖96  On July 7, 2010, the Monitor 
rejected the second IP, citing many of the same problems apparent 
in the first proposal.97  On August 9, 2010, Westchester submitted a 
third iteration of the IP.98  As of October 2010, the Monitor had not 
addressed the adequacy of the latest revised plan.  In short, despite 
cooperation between the Monitor, ADC, and HUD, the extent to 
which Westchester will comply with its AFFH obligations remains 
to be seen. 
 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION 
 
 The Westchester case was the first use of the FCA to 
enforce a local government‘s obligation to affirmatively further fair 
housing, and therefore it represents an innovative model to remedy 
                                                                                                       
94  Id. at 3-4. 
95  Id. at 6-10; see also Amended Monitor‘s Report, supra note 93, at 6, 
7 (discussing deficiencies with implementation plan). 
96  Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD 
Statement on the Revised Implementation Plan of Westchester County, 
New York (Mar. 16, 2010), available at http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/ 
portal/HUD/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2010/HUDNo.10-
051.  
97  Monitor‘s Report Regarding Implementation of the Stipulation 
and Order of Settlement and Dismissal for the Period of February 11, 2010 
through July 6, 2010, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro 
N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty, N.Y., No. 06 Civ. 2860 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 
2010), available at http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/files/ 
Monitor_July_Report.pdf. 
98  WESTCHESTER COUNTY, WESTCHESTER COUNTY FAIR AND 
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the civil rights violations of a major local institution.99  This Part 
situates the Westchester litigation in ongoing academic debates 
about the current state of institutional reform litigation. 
A. The Early Promise and Doctrinal Limits 
 
Institutional reform litigation loosely refers to lawsuits 
where parties seek to significantly restructure public institutions.  
Following Brown v. Board of Education, plaintiffs brought a wave of 
actions challenging systematic constitutional violations by school 
boards, prisons, mental hospitals, and housing authorities.100  Courts 
responded by devising elaborate and detailed injunctive remedies.101 
In 1976, Abram Chayes famously provided an analytic 
description of this new form of litigation.102  Chayes argued that 
these lawsuits exhibited characteristics that differed from the 
―defining features‖ of traditional civil adjudication.103  What Chayes 
called ―public law litigation‖ involved many parties rather than 
merely being a ―contest between two individuals,‖ the remedies 
sought prospective rather than retrospective remedies, and judges, 
                                                                                                       
99  The Westchester case is innovative but not unique.  In one earlier 
case, a District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the government 
based on similar FCA claims alleging a locality ignored conditional spending 
requirements attached to housing grants.  See United States v. Inc. Vill. of 
Island Park, 888 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). It is not clear why the 
government‘s success in this case did not inspire more of these claims.  
Perhaps private parties did not view Island Park as a viable institutional reform 
model because the government, rather than a private relator, initially filed and 
directed the entire FCA action. Relators have brought other FCA actions 
enforcing smaller-scale civil rights violations, generally in combination with 
employment retaliation claims against private defendants. See, e.g., United 
States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931 (10th Cir. 2008) (rejecting 
FCA action based on claim that university falsely certified it was ―minority 
institution‖ eligible for DOD grants); Green v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 507 F.3d 
662 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting claim based on improper certification of minority 
business); Coleman v. Hernandez, 490 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D. Conn. 2007) 
(upholding qui tam action against landlord for improperly charging tenant 
additional expenses above what HUD program allowed).   
100  Scholars often mark Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 
(1955), as the first modern institutional reform case. See, e.g., Jeffries & 
Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 1408; David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through 
Trial Courts:  The Big Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1018 
(2004); ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE 
25 (2003) [hereinafter SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY]. 
101  Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 1409.   
102  Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
103  Id. at 1282-83. 
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rather than parties, became the dominant organizing and guiding 
figures.104  Although Chayes ultimately approved of this new judicial 
role, he warned this style of litigation raised serious legitimacy 
concerns.105 
Following criticism of the legitimacy and efficacy of these 
lawsuits, the Supreme Court began to curb institutional reform 
litigation.  Cases such as Milliken v. Bradley,106 in which interdistrict 
busing was rejected as a remedial measure, signaled that the Court 
was beginning to disfavor expansive court remedies.107  Likewise, in 
cases like City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,108 the Court fashioned a 
doctrine of standing limiting the availability of injunctive relief.109  
As discussed below, despite these doctrinal changes institutional 
reform litigation continues to exist, albeit in varying forms.110 
B. The Case for Institutional Reform Litigation 
 
A common theme underlies most arguments advanced in 
favor of institutional reform litigation:  Courts can be effective 
reformers of social institutions because they are uniquely situated to 
act where elected bodies are ―politically unwilling or structurally 
unable to proceed.‖111  Because they are removed from electoral 
pressures, courts can defend unpopular causes and remedy 
violations of rights.112  Politically and economically weak groups are 
systematically excluded from the political process, whereas influence 
                                                                                                       
104  Id. at 1283. 
105  Id. at 1313-16. 
106  418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
107  Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 1409 (citing Milliken, 418 
U.S. at 744). 
108  461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
109  Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 1410 (citing generally Lyons, 
461 U.S. 95). For more discussion of doctrines limiting the ability of 
advocates to bring structural reform suits and of advocates responses to 
those limitations, see, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 
93 VA. L. REV. 853, 869-74 (2007) (addressing challenges to institutional 
reform and transformation of suits); Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the 
Structural Reform Injunction, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 163-68 (2003) 
(discussing procedural barriers to liberal structural reform suits); John Valery 
White, Foreword: Is Civil Rights Law Dead?, 63 LA. L. REV. 609 (2003) 
(addressing generally the current state of civil rights law). 
110  Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How 
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1018-19 (2004) 
(―There is no indication of a reduction in the volume or importance of 
Chayesian judicial activity.‖). 
111  GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 22 (2d ed. 2008). 
112  Id. 
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in the judiciary (ideally) depends only on the strength of 
argument.113  Finally, courts are catalysts for change, ―indicat[ing] 
publicly that the status quo is illegitimate and cannot continue.‖114 
Supporters of institutional reform litigation also argue that 
critics overstate the constrained nature of courts.  The judicial 
process can be an effective forum for gathering and assessing 
information.115  The adversarial process—combined with procedural 
mechanisms like discovery—facilitates informed decision-making.  
Courts also have developed mechanisms to help them monitor and 
enforce orders:  Special masters can gather information and draft 
remedial decrees, and monitoring commissions allow courts to 
follow the implementation process.116 
Finally, a school of ―experimentalist‖ scholars contend that 
institutional reform litigation has changed significantly from the 
broad structural injunctions that marked early civil rights cases.117  
These scholars argue that recent cases are more focused, and 
consent decrees commonly identify ―goals defendants are expected 
to achieve and specify standards and procedures for measurement of 
performance.‖118  The notion of a judge single-handedly making 
complicated policy determinations is also inaccurate.  Contemporary 
institutional reform litigation is rarely resolved through ―command 
and control‖ mechanisms dictated by a judge but instead centers 
around a negotiated process involving multiple stakeholders.119  
Under this view, judges are not faced with creating complicated 
remedies themselves.  Rather, the role of the court is to structure an 
environment for affected actors to ―collaboratively derive standards, 
procedures for revising them, and mechanisms of accountability for 
those subject to them.‖120  As discussed below, some scholars 
                                                                                                       
113  Id. at 23-24. 
114  Sabel & Simon, supra note 110, at 1056. 
115  ROSENBERG, supra note 111, at 24. 
116  Id. at 26-27. 
117  For an introduction to the experimentalist model of judicial 
intervention, see Sabel & Simon, supra note 110, at 1056; see also Olatunde 
C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 416 n.185 (2007) 
(collecting literature on experimentalist regimes); William S. Koski, The 
Evolving Role of the Courts in School Reform Twenty Years After Rose, 98 KY. L.J. 
789, 806 (2010) (providing an overview of experimentalist school reform 
model).  
118  Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 1411. 
119  Sabel & Simon, supra note 110, at 1018-19; Zaring, supra note 100, 
at 1022-37 (contrasting unilateralist model with multilateralist model of 
institutional reform litigation). 
120  Sabel & Simon, supra note 110, at 1089. 
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question the accuracy and efficacy of this experimentalist model,121 
but at a minimum the forms of these lawsuits have evolved 
significantly since the early days of institutional reform litigation. 
 
C. Criticisms of Institutional Reform Litigation 
 
A simple narrative highlights common criticisms of 
institutional reform litigation:  Courts generally will not be effective 
producers of significant social reform because judicial institutions 
are ill-suited to develop and implement remedies sufficient to 
vindicate the underlying rights.122 
A common critique lodged against institutional reform 
litigation is that it seeks to effectuate lofty, and often poorly defined, 
rights.  These rights have traditionally been constitutional—a 
difficult strategy because many social reform goals are not easily 
framed as constitutional violations.123  Relatedly, courts are limited 
in their ability, or willingness, to recognize novel extensions of 
existing rights.124  When courts do grasp the nettle, they articulate 
aspirational goals—for instance, dismantling segregated schools 
―root and branch.‖125 Professors Ross Sandler and David 
Schoenbrod term these lofty goals ―soft rights‖:  Unlike traditional 
rights, which courts enforce to the hilt, these rights are enforced 
―only to the extent [the parties or the judge] thinks it makes sense to 
do so in view of society‘s competing priorities‖126  Nor is this 
problem resolved by the fact that most contemporary cases focus on 
statutory and regulatory violations rather than constitutional ones.127  
Critics argue that the rights and obligations expressed in statutes like 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
                                                                                                       
121  See discussion infra for text accompanying notes 173-174. 
122  ROSENBERG, supra note 111, at 10. 
123  Id. at 11. 
124  Id. 
125  Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430, 438 
(1968); see also SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 100, at 
102 (describing phenomenon). 
126  SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 100, at 103; 
Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, The Supreme Court, Democracy and 
Institutional Reform Litigation, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 915, 933 (2004-2005) 
[hereinafter Sandler & Schoenbrod, Supreme Court] (providing example of 
congressional command that local governments achieve adoption for foster 
care children within fifteen months). 
127  Sandler & Schoenbrod, Supreme Court, supra note 126, at 926. 
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(ADA) are no less aspirational than the constitutional violations 
litigated in the past.128 
Skeptics also make the point that courts are constrained in 
their ability to develop and enforce complicated injunctive relief and 
consent orders to remedy these rights.  Courts are well-equipped to 
decide traditional tort or contract actions because these suits require 
a limited intervention.  Public law liability, on the other hand, 
involves technical policy determinations with long-term impacts, 
and courts lack the expertise and specialization to adequately 
formulate these polices.129  As Judge Frank M. Johnson stated, 
―[j]udges are trained in the law.  They are not penologists, 
psychiatrists, public administrators, or educators.‖130  
Institutional reform supporters respond that judges are not 
required to develop policy in a vacuum.  Resolution of cases often 
happens through consent decrees, where litigants, experts, and 
monitors engage in a form of ―supervised political bargaining.‖131  
Sandler and Schoenbrod, however, argue that these ―controlling 
groups‖ of lawyers create more problems than they solve.132  First, 
plaintiffs‘ attorneys may advance their vision of the public interest at 
the expense of their clients.133  Second, because they are generally 
not named parties and have few incentives to get involved, the 
federal agencies designated to manage many of the programs at issue 
rarely play major roles in the litigation.134  Finally, institutional 
reform litigation subverts democratic principles by redirecting power 
from elected political bodies to the courts or a controlling group of 
lawyers.135  In short, critics maintain that institutional reform 
                                                                                                       
128  SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 100, at 103-
09 (arguing state obligation to make public programs and facilities accessible 
is an aspirational goal).  
129  ROSENBERG, supra note 111, at 16; Sabel & Simon, supra note 110, 
at 1017 (articulating criticisms). 
130  Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional 
Litigation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 271, 274 (1981). 
131  Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 1409. 
132  SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 100, at 118-
19. 
133  Id. at 124-25. 
134  Id. at 135-38 (arguing plaintiffs, defendants, and federal officials 
are generally happy when federal agencies are not involved).  
135  Sabel & Simon, supra note 110, at 1090 (articulating the argument 
regarding subverting control from the democratic process to the courts); 
Sandler & Schoenbrod, Supreme Court, supra note 126, at 916 (articulating the 
argument with respect to a ―controlling group‖ of lawyers). 
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litigation represents an unwarranted and ineffective cooption of 
policymaking from political representatives to courts and lawyers.136 
 
V. TESTING THE WESTCHESTER MODEL  
 
FCA actions are responsive to many of the criticisms leveled 
at institutional reform litigation.  As discussed below, the form of an 
FCA suit resembles a breach of contract action, something courts 
are well-suited to adjudicate.  It is true that violations of federal 
spending conditions are more complicated than ordinary contractual 
breaches because the congressional spending power implicates 
accountability and federalism concerns.  But FCA actions should 
not run afoul of the Supreme Court‘s directive that spending 
conditions be unambiguous.  Therefore, the fact that defendants buy 
into obligations underlying FCA suits by accepting federal grants 
mitigates accountability and federalism concerns associated with 
traditional institutional reform suits.  Moreover, federal agencies are 
likely to become involved in FCA suits, thereby addressing doubts 
that private parties and courts lack the expertise to effectively 
remedy violations.  Although FCA suits might infringe on executive 
prerogatives, certain procedural mechanisms in qui tam actions 
mediate these worries as well. 
This Part concludes with some thoughts on the potential of 
FCA suits to effectively reform social institutions.  On the one hand, 
civil rights advocates surrender power over crafting remedies in an 
FCA suit, and scholars dispute the efficacy of the experimentalist 
model of institutional reform.  But features of FCA suits, such as 
agency expertise and the possibility for federal funding of settlement 
implementation, suggest these lawsuits have the potential to be 
effective nonetheless. 
 
A. Is the FCA Model Responsive to Institutional Reform 
Critiques?  
 
1. FCA Violation as Contractual Breach  
 
A primary criticism of institutional reform litigation posits 
that efforts to enforce aspirational ―soft rights‖ are misguided.  For 
instance, Sander & Schoenbrod contend that courts really cannot be 
expected to ensure air would be ―made fully healthy‖ by the end of 
                                                                                                       
136  Empirical evidence exists supporting both views of the 
effectiveness of institutional reform litigation.  See ROSENBERG, supra note 
111, at 27-36 (discussing empirical studies). 
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the 1970s, as the CAA required.137  Rather, when faced with 
violations of aspirational rights, courts must decide ―how far . . . [to] 
push government to pursue a soft right, and that decision will 
necessarily balance the soft right against government‘s competing 
priorities.‖138  Because this judicial balancing is policy-laden, it 
implicates federalism and accountability concerns.  An aspirational 
federal statute allows Congress to take credit for addressing a 
complex problem, while hoisting implementation costs on local 
actors.  Moreover, the least democratic branch is charged with 
delineating the contours of the broad right. 
The hybrid nature of an FCA action responds to this 
criticism.  First, localities buy into requirements by accepting federal 
grants, thereby mediating Congress‘s ability to pass on obligations to 
unwilling local actors.  Second, an FCA relator does not ask a court 
to remedy a violation of an underlying civil right.  Rather, the 
relator‘s claim more closely resembles a traditional contract action 
than an institutional reform suit.  The relator identifies an agreement 
for federal funds between a locality and the federal government and 
points out a knowing violation of that agreement.   
The narrative presented in the previous paragraph, however, 
oversimplifies the contractual nature of federal conditional grants.  
Conditional grants, of course, are not merely contracts between the 
federal government and localities because the exchange of funds 
between these governmental entities raises federalism concerns.  
Therefore, adequately addressing problems of enforcing breaches of 
these conditions through the FCA requires a fuller discussion of 
Congress‘s authority to create conditional grants under its spending 
power.   
The Supreme Court has articulated three direct limitations 
on the spending power:  (1) conditions on grants must be made in 
pursuit of the ―general welfare,‖ (2) conditions must be related to 
the federal interest in the particular program, and (3) there is some 
point at which ―the financial inducement offered by Congress might 
be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion.‖139 These constraints, however, do little to limit 
conditional spending.140   
                                                                                                       
137  SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 100, at 103. 
138  Id. 
139  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-11 (1987) (internal 
quotations omitted).   
140  Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 
58 DUKE L.J. 345, 355 (2008) (―None of these direct limitations on the 
spending power has had any real bite in the cases.‖); Brian Galle, Getting 
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Instead, the Court has indirectly constrained the ability to 
enforce funding conditions by applying the ―clear statement‖ canon 
of statutory construction:  Conditions are only enforceable to the 
extent they provide ―clear notice regarding the liability at issue.‖141  
The Court justifies the use of this canon by invoking an analogy to 
notice in contract law: ― ‗[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the 
spending power is much in the nature of a contract,‘ and therefore, 
to be bound by ‗federally imposed conditions,‘ recipients of federal 
funds must accept them ‗voluntarily and knowingly.‘ ‖142 
Scholars dispute whether the contract analogy adequately 
justifies the clear statement rule,143 but for the purposes of this 
Article, it is sufficient to note that FCA suits do not offend the 
notice principle because the FCA requirement that a defendant 
―knowingly‖ commit fraud should ensure that defendants have clear 
notice of their obligations before liability will attach.144  The district 
court in Westchester held that the relevant regulatory and statutory 
background combined with HUD guidance materials were 
sufficiently clear to create liability, and there existed a triable issue of 
fact as to whether the County was on notice of its AFFH 
obligations.145  An accurate analysis of FCA liability based on a 
violation of conditional spending requirements, therefore, should 
track whether the underlying program provides sufficiently clear 
notice to recipients.  On this reading, the FCA does not undermine 
the notice concerns driving the clear statement rule, as the statute 
addresses whether the grantee is aware of its obligations.146 
                                                                                                       
Spending:  How to Replace Clear Statement Rules With Clear Thinking About 
Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 162 (2004) 
[hereinafter Galle, Spending] (―No modern court of appeals has ever held that 
an expenditure did not advance the general welfare, or that a state was 
coerced into accepting the conditions attached to a federal grant.  Only very 
rarely have courts found that a condition was not reasonably related to the 
spending it accompanied.‖).   
141  Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 
296 (2006); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 
17 (1981). 
142  Murphy, 548 U.S. at 296 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17). 
143  See Galle, Spending, supra note 140, at 166-74 (arguing contract 
principles do not justify clear notice); see also Bagenstos, supra note 140, at 
393-407 (same). 
144  31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A) & (B) (West 2010). 
145  United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. 
v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 561-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
146  The existence of FCA damages, however, might cast a shadow 
over a court‘s determination of whether an underlying statute provides clear 
notice of liability. For instance, in the recent case of Arlington Central School 
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Aside from the notice issue, an FCA action based on a 
violation of a spending condition might be problematic for another 
reason.  Federal spending might be so significant that local officials 
are coerced into accepting money, regardless of whether conditions 
undercut their own interests or other federalism principles, such as 
ensuring a diversity of local policies.147  The clear statement rule, 
then, limits the instances in which these values will be sacrificed on 
account of localities‘ acceptance of federal money.148    
This insight illuminates a comparison of FCA actions to 
traditional institutional reform suits.  One critique of institutional 
reform litigation is that local legislatures often have little flexibility in 
responding to constitutional violations.  Communities have scarce 
resources, and correcting violations of aspirational rights requires 
policy decisions about how those resources are best allocated.  FCA 
actions are more palatable than traditional institutional reform suits 
because they are based on ―contractual‖ violations where localities 
bought into obligations underlying their FCA liability; those 
obligations, in turn, were subject to negotiation between political 
bodies.  Accordingly, localities could have refused the federal money 
and could refuse future grants.  But the federalism concerns that 
inform the clear statement rule—namely, that localities can be 
coerced into accepting funds—suggest these options might be 
illusory. 
Identifying when federal grants are coercive enough to 
undermine federalism principles such as favoring locally tailored 
policies requires an account of why and when local decision-makers 
accept conditional funds.   After investigating this question, 
                                                                                                       
District Board of Education v. Murphy, the Court concluded that an act‘s fee-
shifting provision—entitling prevailing parents to recover ―reasonable 
attorneys‘ fees as part of the costs‖ in proceedings to enforce the statute—
did not put states on notice that they would be liable to pay those parents‘ 
expert fees.  548 U.S. 291, 300-03 (2006).  Cases addressing the enforceability 
of spending conditions are matters of statutory construction, but when a 
condition is found enforceable, a knowing breach of that condition might 
also entail treble damages and statutory penalties under the FCA.  See 31 
U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1).  It would not be surprising if a court‘s awareness of 
this increased liability mitigated a willingness to find a condition enforceable. 
147  Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 879 
(2008) [hereinafter Galle, Federal Grants].  See also Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. 
v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 655 (1999) (―Only if States 
receive clear notice of the conditions attached to federal funds can they 
guard against excessive federal intrusion into state affairs and be vigilant in 
policing the boundaries of federal power.‖). 
148  See Galle, Spending, supra note 140, at 183-85 (discussing federalism 
justifications for clear statement rule). 
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Professor Brian Galle concludes that local decision-makers are 
capable of making rational decisions about the interests furthered by 
accepting or declining conditional funds.  He posits that there is no 
evidence for the proposition that ―state decisions to accept funds 
fail to preserve the values that federalism protects.‖149  A full 
account of the conditions under which localities accept federal funds 
is beyond the scope of this Article, but if Galle‘s conclusions are 
correct, the contractual nature of FCA actions may assuage some 
federalism concerns generally levied at institutional reform litigation.   
At the least, recognition that federal spending conditions 
implicate accountability and federalism principles complicates the 
claim that FCA actions are analogous to suits enforcing contractual 
breaches.  However, FCA suits should at least loosely track the 
Supreme Court‘s clear statement rule, thereby alleviating notice 
concerns.  Moreover, a strong basis exists to conclude that FCA 
suits are less threatening to accountability and federalism interests 
than traditional institutional reform litigation because defendants 
bought into spending conditions and can choose to opt-out of 
future federal spending obligations. 
 
2. Consent Decrees and Injunctive Relief  
 
Another criticism of traditional institutional reform litigation 
posits that because judicial institutions lack expertise and monitoring 
capabilities, they are ill-suited to devise remedies for violations of 
aspirational rights.  FCA suits are responsive to this claim as well.  
First, the FCA does not provide for injunctive relief.  The damages 
remedy normally available to relators should be less offensive to 
critics of institutional reform litigation—for example, cases like 
Lyons and Rizzo limited injunctive relief, but endorsed money 
damages.150 
This limitation on the form of remedy does not end the 
matter:  Even if a court cannot impose injunctive relief, the parties 
are not precluded from entering a settlement that includes equitable 
components.151  Most institutional reform cases that are not 
                                                                                                       
149  Galle, Federal Grants, supra note 147, at 934-35. 
150  See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-12 (1983); 
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-380 (1976); see also Jeffries & Rutherglen, 
supra note 2, at 1417 (discussing remedies in both Lyons and Rizzo). 
151  Parties may join an FCA suit with causes of action that provide 
for injunctive relief.  Upon intervening in Westchester, the government sought 
injunctive relief under the Housing and Community Development Act.  See 
Complaint-in-Intervention of the United States of America, United States ex 
rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 
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dismissed are resolved through consent decrees anyway, and the 
potential for significant liability under the FCA—treble damages 
plus statutory penalties—provides defendants with a strong 
incentive to settle.  Therefore, critics of institutional reform could 
reasonably posit that an FCA action ultimately retains the problems 
associated with litigation directed by a controlling group of lawyers.   
The private attorneys, however, are significantly less 
powerful in a qui tam suit than in a traditional institutional reform 
action.  Recall that the relators must present their claim to the 
federal government, which can then intervene and take over the 
suit.152  For instance, in Westchester, the federal government 
intervened after the private relators were granted summary judgment 
on several important elements.153  Most scholars agree that when 
federal officials engage in structural reform litigation, the remedies 
they seek are not as problematic as those sought only by private 
plaintiffs.154  Court orders obtained by federal officials ―involve 
some degree of political accountability in the decision to sue and to 
seek structural relief‖ and can be seen as ―an acceptable form of 
bargaining between governments.‖155 
Moreover, intervention by the federal government implies 
involvement by the federal agency charged with implementing the 
underlying program.  For instance, HUD played an active role in 
negotiating the Westchester settlement, and it has continued to 
participate in monitoring and evaluating Westchester‘s 
implementation plans.156  Critics complain that private advocates 
lack the necessary expertise and sensitivity to the realities of local 
government to design realistic remedies.  These criticisms are less 
persuasive when directed against the federal agency charged with 
implementing the relevant program.  Agencies arguably have the 
                                                                                                       
No. 06 Civ. 2860 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009).  It also appears that settlements 
may contain injunctive elements even when causes of action provide only 
for damages.  Cf. Local No. 93, Int‘l Ass‘n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. City 
of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (noting courts are not ―barred from 
entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief 
than the court could have awarded after a trial‖). 
152  See supra Section II.A.2. 
153  See supra notes 80-81. 
154  Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 1414; Sabel & Simon, supra 
note 110, at 1091 & n.218; Zaring, supra note 100, at 1067-70. 
155  Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 1421. 
156  See supra Section III.B; see also Press Release, Dep‘t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., HUD Statement on the Revised Implementation Plan of 
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―best information about and most sophisticated understanding‖ of 
complex policy questions implicated by enforcement issues.157 
 
3. Infringing on Executive Prerogatives 
 
Even if agency involvement is desirable, it still might be the 
case that the FCA improperly allows a relator to co-opt the federal 
government‘s enforcement discretion.  HUD has chosen not to 
enforce the AFFH provisions in the CDBG program; the 
Westchester defendants specifically noted that it submitted its 
documents to HUD, and HUD continued to grant it funds.158  This 
determination was likely a conscious agency decision to allocate 
resources in a particular manner, a species of agency action generally 
afforded great deference.159 
Addressing the extent to which an FCA action infringes on 
agency policymaking requires pulling apart why agency discretion is 
so strong in such circumstances.  If the underlying concern is that 
agencies have limited resources, then FCA actions do not infringe 
significantly on agency power because private actors fund the 
litigation.  In fact, the public-private enforcement partnership is one 
of the great benefits of FCA actions.  The federal government has 
insufficient resources to adequately uncover fraud, and the qui tam 
provision incentivizes private parties to take the reins in certain 
cases.  Private enforcement offers efficacy gains because private 
parties are often more apt at detecting violations than are agencies, 
and they can ―correct for agency slack‖ due to political pressure, 
laziness, or self-interest.160   
But agencies are accorded discretion in enforcement for 
other reasons as well.  Maximum enforcement is not necessarily 
optimal, and private parties may be ―insufficiently sensitive to the 
litigation costs of their suits,‖ including strains on judicial resources 
                                                                                                       
157  Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The 
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 127 
(2005). 
158  United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. 
v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 
2009). 
159  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007).  Of course, 
an FCA action does not challenge an agency enforcement decision and is 
therefore not governed by the principle that agency decisions not to take 
enforcement action are presumptively non-reviewable. See Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
160  Stephenson, supra note 157, at 107-13. 
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and disruptive impacts on affected communities.161  Agencies also 
may be better equipped to target enforcement actions that advance 
social interests.  Accordingly, legislatures often react to complex 
policy problems by deliberately promulgating broad statutes, leaving 
to the discretion of expert agencies questions of appropriate 
enforcement levels.162  Additionally, private enforcement might 
upset partnerships between regulators and regulated entities because 
it can undermine cooperative efforts, and it may impede agency 
techniques designed to incentivize industry self-regulation.163 
The FCA model assuages some of these concerns.  If the 
government intervenes, it has the power to dismiss the action.164  
Likewise, the government can settle the action so long as the court 
determines the settlement is fair.165  Therefore, the executive retains 
significant control over the amount and type of FCA suits.  One 
criticism remains:  Simply responding to these FCA actions might 
affect agencies‘ enforcement agendas.166  But, some private influence 
over agency priorities is tolerated in other instances—for example, 
citizen suits may pose the same problems for agencies, and 
interested persons may petition for agency rulemaking167—
suggesting this critique need not be fatal.   
Moreover, HUD may be able to preserve control over 
enforcement of the AFFH provision through regulations or policy 
statements.  Courts have not decided conclusively whether 
regulations can provide the clarity requisite to make spending 
conditions enforceable against states and localities.168  If agency 
                                                                                                       
161  Id. at 114-15. 
162  Id. at 116. 
163  Id.  For a discussion of whether the qui tam structure of the FCA 
infringes the Take Care Clause of Article II, see Pamela H. Bucy, Private 
Justice and the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939, 950-56 (2002) (arguing that 
the executive branch retains sufficient control over relator to satisfy the 
Take Care Clause under Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)); see also 
infra note 185 (addressing constitutional arguments). 
164  31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(c)(2)(A). 
165  Id. § 3730(c)(2)(B). 
166  Stephenson, supra note 157, at 118-19. 
167  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006).   
168  Galle, Federal Grants, supra note 147, at 883.  Under the contractual 
―notice‖ theory of conditional spending, federal regulations should be 
relevant. But allowing Congress to enact ambiguous conditions later 
enforceable by agencies might undermine federalism principles by depriving 
states of an opportunity to oppose the condition through the political 
process. See Galle, Spending, supra note 140, at 164 (noting that disagreements 
between the majority and dissent reflected these principles in Davis ex rel. 
LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999)).   
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actions can provide the necessary clear notice, then agencies like 
HUD maintain the ability to shape what constitutes a violation of 
the underlying grant conditions, thereby retaining control over 
potential FCA suits.  This point cuts in two directions.  The power 
to promulgate regulations allows HUD to crystallize grantees‘ 
AFFH obligations.  At the same time, the potential for FCA liability 
may disincentivize HUD from promulgating regulations for fear of 
over-enforcement, thereby increasing the likelihood that AFFH 
conditions would not provide sufficiently clear notice to be 
enforceable under the clear statement canon.   
In sum, the degree to which FCA actions infringe on 
executive prerogatives is indeterminate.  Statutory provisions in the 
FCA reserve to executive agencies a significant amount of control 
over enforcement activities.  Likewise, agencies retain the ability to 
shape what constitutes a violation of the underlying obligations to 
be enforced through an FCA lawsuit.  In contrast, like other private 
enforcement mechanisms, FCA suits may interfere with an agency‘s 
enforcement agenda.  Similarly, the potential for FCA liability may 
threaten over-enforcement to such a degree so as to disincentivize 
agency action crystallizing obligations of grantees.   
 
B. Will the FCA Model Sufficiently Protect Civil Rights? 
 
If the FCA model mediates some of the critiques levied 
against institutional reform litigation, do these actions retain the 
characteristics that make public law litigation a powerful tool?  The 
FCA model preserves the most important feature of institutional 
reform litigation:  politically insulated courts.169  This characteristic 
allows courts to champion politically unpopular causes, and courts 
maintain the ability to act as catalysts for change, ―indicat[ing] 
publicly that the status quo is illegitimate and cannot continue.‖170  
Westchester is a terrific example of this phenomenon.  The case 
attracted significant media attention and the Deputy Secretary of 
HUD identified the litigation as a model case for future AFFH 
enforcement.171 
In contrast, courts‘ hands are tied with respect to injunctive 
remedies.  Under the public law model, the insulated nature of 
courts is important not only with respect to identifying violations, 
but also because courts are uniquely situated to impose necessary 
                                                                                                       
169  See supra Part IV.B. 
170  Sabel & Simon, supra note 110, at 1056. 
171  See supra Part III.B (discussing news releases). 
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remedies, even at great cost.  Money damages are unlikely to 
adequately remedy most systemic civil rights violations.  
Even with the possibility of consent decrees containing 
equitable relief, the very features that make FCA actions palatable to 
critics of institutional reform might be limitations from the 
perspective of structural reform advocates.  The potential for federal 
intervention signals cooption of an advocate‘s litigation and may 
result in settlements that are less expansive or insufficiently 
protective of civil rights.  Additionally, FCA procedures facilitate 
coordination between various stakeholders—private advocates, local 
decision-makers, and federal agencies—and thereby track many of 
the collaborative features of the experimentalist model of public 
litigation.172  While at first blush these features may seem beneficial, 
critics who are otherwise in favor of liberal institutional reform 
litigation have charged that democratic experimentalist scholars may 
―err on the side of optimistic overstatement,‖ and accordingly, 
―experimentalist governance exists primarily in the eyes of its 
beholders, rather than in the world itself.‖173  These scholars 
contend that this model understates the complexity of competing 
interests, and in practice, collaboration in benchmarking and 
revising goals rarely produces results desired by civil rights 
advocates.174   
Evaluating the efficacy of these collaborative schemes 
requires empirical analyses beyond the scope of this Article.  But 
some evidence does suggest that reform is more likely to be 
effective in the long-term where there is support from the federal 
government, and positive incentives are offered to induce 
compliance.175  In fact, close to seventy percent of Westchester‘s 
total settlement went back into the County‘s account with HUD, to 
be returned to Westchester in pursuance of the development of 
affordable housing.176  In other words, rather than an unfunded 
                                                                                                       
172  See supra Part IV.B (discussing features of experimentalist model).  
173  See Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin‟s New 
Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 674-75 (noting criticisms).   
174  See, e.g., Richard Elmore, Details, Details, Details, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 315 (2003) (presenting general criticisms of democratic 
experimentalism); Martha Minow, School Reform Outside Laboratory Conditions, 
28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 333 (2003) (same); Mark Tushnet, A 
New Constitutionalism for Liberals, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 
(2003) (same).  
175  ROSENBERG, supra note 111, at 36. 
176  See Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal para. 2, 
United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. 
Westchester Cnty., N.Y., No. 06 Civ. 2860 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009). 
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order requiring a locality to rearrange its limited budget to remedy a 
constitutional violation, FCA actions directed at grant recipients can 
offer the underlying grant as a carrot.  Westchester has an obvious 
incentive to comply with the order—more federal money. 
Moreover, FCA actions are not a substitute for traditional 
lawsuits aimed at remedying constitutional or statutory violations.  
But as discussed above, doctrinal developments such as restrictive 
standing requirements have made traditional reform suits harder to 
win.177  According to one author, as far as injunctive relief is 
concerned, meaningful enforcement of civil rights is now left ―solely 
to the government.‖178 Moreover, as noted above, federal 
enforcement has been seriously lacking.179  The FCA model injects 
back into this public enforcement model many of the characteristics 
that make private enforcement effective:  ―the eyes, experiences, 
motivations, and resources of millions of Americans who bear 
witness to institutionalized wrongdoing and are willing to endure the 
expense of rooting it out.‖180  The FCA model provides a 
mechanism to tap into these private resources despite doctrinal 




The future of FCA litigation looks promising, and this 
Article suggests that the qui tam model can be an effective method 
of sparking institutional reform.  Thousands of grantees accept 
federal money without adequately abiding by civil rights conditions 
attached to the grants they receive.  There are currently over one 
thousand jurisdictions participating in the CDBG program, few of 
which have adequately addressed their fair housing obligations.181  
Congress also conditions federal grants on agreements to promote 
civil rights norms through various other statutes.182  Finally, 
                                                                                                       
177  See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text. 
178  Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation:  Deputizing 
Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 
1386 (2000). 
179  See supra Part II.B.2. 
180  Gilles, supra note 178, at 1387. 
181  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
182  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that recipients of 
federal funds refrain from using federal money to discriminate on the basis 
of race and ethnicity, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006); the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 forbids disability discrimination in federally-funded programs and 
activities, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006); and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 forbids gender discrimination in educational programs 
that receive federal funds, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).  See Johnson, supra note 
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considering Congress‘s renewed interest in the FCA, relators should 
have an easier time bringing FCA claims in the future.   
A few issues, however, caution against too rosy a view of 
future FCA claims.  Importantly, while municipalities can be liable 
under the qui tam provision of the FCA, states cannot be subject to 
FCA liability.183  This limitation severely restricts the range of 
institutional actors potentially subject to reform under the FCA 
model.  Moreover, because of its unique statutory structure, the 
FCA implicates several constitutional concerns.  Other articles tackle 
these questions in detail,184 and courts generally have not been 
receptive to these sorts of challenges.185  But these constitutional 
                                                                                                       
44 (discussing various spending conditions); see also Gilles, supra note 178 
(proposing qui tam amendment to statute authorizing DOJ to seek 
injunctive remedies against police departments); see generally Dayna Bowen 
Matthew, A New Strategy to Combat Racial Inequality in American Health Care 
Delivery, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 793 (2005) (proposing relators bring 
FCA actions against medical care providers for failure to abide by Title VI 
requirements).  
183  Compare Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784 (2000) (holding that states are not ―persons‖ 
subject to qui tam liability under the FCA) with Cook County, Ill. v. United 
States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 128-29 (2003) (distinguishing Stevens 
and holding that municipalities are subject to qui tam liability under the 
FCA).   
184  See Bucy, supra note 163, at 949-56 (discussing arguments); Gilles, 
supra note 178, at 1433-49 (discussing constitutional concerns associated 
with qui tam actions and other provisions ―deputizing‖ private citizens to 
enforce public laws). 
185  For instance, empowering private persons to serve as private 
attorneys general may violate the Take Care Clause by infringing too heavily 
on executive power.  However, because of the substantial power retained by 
the DOJ in FCA cases, various Circuit Courts of Appeals have found the 
FCA does not violate this Clause.  See United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell 
Int‘l Corp., 282 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2002); Riley v. St. Luke‘s Episcopal 
Hosp., 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001); United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against 
Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. 
Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993).  Additionally, if qui tam 
relators are considered ―officers,‖ their role in the FCA could infringe on 
the Appointments Clause.  Several Circuits also have rejected this argument, 
in large part because relators do not have expansive responsibility or power.  
Rockwell, 282 F.3d at 804-05; Riley, 252 F.3d at 757-58; Taxpayers Against 
Fraud, 41 F.3d at 1041-42; Kelly, 9 F.3d at 757-59.  FCA defendants also have 
advanced arguments, largely unsuccessfully, under the Excessive Fines 
Clause and under the Due Process Clause.  See, e.g., United States v. Mackby, 
339 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing applicability of the 
Excessive Fines Clause to FCA damages and finding no violation given the 
specific damages awarded); Kelly, 9 F.3d at 759-60 (dismissing defendant‘s 
due process argument).  Lastly, the Supreme Court recently resolved 
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issues could become mechanisms that allow courts skeptical of 
institutional reform litigation to derail future FCA actions.  
Relatedly, the Court requires clear notice before spending conditions 
will be enforced against state and local grantees.186  The court in 
Westchester did not squarely address this issue, but the clear statement 
rule could dissuade future courts from finding violations of 
spending conditions enforceable through the FCA.   
Finally, after several months of efforts by the Court 
Monitor, HUD, and ADC, Westchester County has yet to devise an 
adequate implementation plan.  The success or failure of the 
Westchester litigation—including the continued depth and vitality of 
HUD participation and the degree of judicial involvement eventually 
required to enforce the settlement decree—will be key data points in 
assessing the efficacy of the FCA model of institutional reform. 
                                                                                                       
standing issues under the FCA, holding that ―[t]he FCA can reasonably be 
regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government‘s damages 
claim,‖ and therefore, the ―United States‘ injury in fact suffices to confer 
standing‖ on relators.  Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773-74. 
186  See supra Part V.A.1. 
